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Abstract 
The contractual mechanism of software development outsourcing, typically either fixed-price 
(FP) or time-and-materials (T&M), determines the nature of incentives, risk sharing, and 
coordination between client and vendor. While software engineering considers project size as 
crucial for project planning and success, neither economic nor organizational theory considers 
size per se among the determinants of contract choice. In this paper, we address the gap between 
the centrality of project size in the software engineering literature and the attention it receives in 
software contracting research by modeling and testing the association between project size and 
contract choice. Existing empirical evidence indicates that FP contracts are appropriate for small 
development efforts whereas T&M contracts are suitable for larger projects, based on the 
reasoning that cost and schedule are difficult to estimate in larger projects. This prediction that 
size is directly associated with contract choice is the basis upon which two models are 
developed. The first model draws on the contracting efficiency approach to hypothesize that the 
effect of project size on contract choice is mediated by project detail. The second model draws 
on the contingency approach to software development risk management to hypothesize that the 
effect of project size on contract choice is moderated by project detail and vendor familiarity. We 
test these models using a large portfolio of software development contracts entered into by a 
leading European bank, and the results confirm that both mediation and moderation are at play.  
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Introduction 
The choice of contractual mechanism, typically between fixed-price (FP) and time-and-materials 
(T&M) contracts, encapsulates important economic and organizational aspects of software 
development outsourcing (Kautz, 2009; Lichtenstein, 2004). From an economic standpoint, these 
two contract types allocate risk very differently. Whereas vendors bear the full risk of cost 
escalation in FP contracts, clients accept this risk in T&M contracts in exchange for a lower risk 
of costly contractual amendments (Aubert et al., 2005) and lower uncertainty related to the long-
term outcomes of the developed system (Laffont & Tirole, 1993). From an organizational 
standpoint, FP contracts require formal planning and relatively complete requirement documents, 
whereas T&M contracts allow for loose requirements and focus on the interaction between client 
and vendor during software development (Kautz, 2009).  
Given the importance of contract choice, research has prescribed the optimal choice under 
various circumstances. Specifically, FP contracts are appropriate for simple software projects 
that require short development time (Dey et al., 2010), whereas T&M contracts are appropriate 
for larger projects, and those with uncertain requirements (Gopal et al., 2003). 
In this paper, we focus on this advice for larger projects and those with short development 
time by analyzing the role of project size in contract choice. We argue that there is a gap between 
the centrality of project size in the software engineering literature and the attention it receives in 
software contracting research. While software engineering considers project size as crucial for 
project planning and success (Banker & Kemerer, 1989; Barki et al., 1993; Boehm, 1981), 
neither economic nor organizational theory considers size per se among the determinants of 
governance structure. Economic theory views contract choice as a way to balance the costs of 
drafting detailed contracts with the benefits of reducing vendor opportunism (Crocker & 
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Reynolds, 1993; Williamson, 1985). These costs and benefits are related to asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and transaction frequency (Macher & Richman, 2008) but not to transaction size. 
Similarly, when the focus is on risk, contract choice is primarily related to risk sharing (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and not to the size of the venture (Eisenhardt, 1985). Organizational theories of 
governance structure similarly pay little attention to project size. Control theory balances social 
or clan control with performance control (Ouchi, 1979). The latter can take the shape of outcome 
or behavior control depending on the programmability of the task and the measurability of 
outcome and behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, the application of contingency theory 
(Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) to software project risk management (Barki et al., 
2001) highlights the fit between risk exposure and risk management profile. Project size, 
however, is not directly addressed in these organizational theories.   
We aim at bridging this gap between software engineering, which generally has a technical 
focus, and software contracting, which pays more attention to economic and commercial aspects, 
by explaining why project size matters for contract choice in software development outsourcing. 
Existing empirical evidence shows that larger software projects are associated with a higher 
probability of T&M contracts, based on the software engineering reasoning that cost and 
schedule are more difficult to estimate ex ante in larger projects (Gopal et al., 2003). We regard 
this observation that project size is associated with contract choice as a baseline for theorizing 
how these two variables are related. We then develop two models, rooted in economic and 
organizational theory and incorporating additional mechanisms and project attributes, in order to 
account for the relationship between project size and contract choice.  
The first model is theoretically rooted in the contracting efficiency approach (Crocker & 
Reynolds, 1993), which considers contracts to be efficient when the costs of additional resources 
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expended in ex ante design are balanced against the benefits of mitigating ex post opportunism. 
We rely on this contracting efficiency reasoning to introduce project detail and vendor 
familiarity as two key determinants of contract choice, given that project detail is related to the 
costs of ex ante design and that vendor familiarity is related to the benefits of a lower likelihood 
of ex post vendor opportunism. This approach suggests that the effect of project size on contract 
choice is not direct but rather mediated by the project attributes that reflect contracting costs and 
benefits. We find theoretical support for such mediation by project detail but not by vendor 
familiarity. The first model, which is accordingly called the contracting-cost mediation model, 
hypothesizes that larger projects are more costly to define in detail and thus associated with less 
detail per unit of size, making it more efficient to use T&M contracts for larger projects.  
Whereas the first model highlights the mechanism through which project size and contract 
choice are related, the second model highlights the conditions under which they are related. The 
second model is theoretically rooted in the contingency approach to software project risk 
management (Barki et al., 2001), which considers project performance to be contingent on the fit 
between risk exposure and risk management. This approach implies that attributes of risk 
management moderate the implications of project size on contract choice. We rely on this risk 
management reasoning to consider project detail and vendor familiarity as two key attributes of 
the risk management profile in software projects. This contingency approach suggests that 
different conditions may result in FP and T&M contracts being used for projects of comparable 
size. The second model, which is accordingly called the project-risk moderation model, 
hypothesizes that T&M contracts are less likely to be used for larger projects under conditions of 
high project detail (because there is enough detail to agree on a fixed price) or low vendor 
familiarity (because it increases the likelihood of opportunism in the relatively open T&M 
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contracts). These two models therefore provide alternative, theoretically-derived explanations of 
how project size is associated with contract choice. We test these models with a large portfolio of 
software development contracts of a leading European bank and find varying levels of support 
for each of the models.    
This paper contributes to the literature by extending the conceptualization and evidence 
about the relationship between software project size and contract choice beyond a direct 
association between larger projects and T&M contracts. While both models incorporate 
additional project attributes, they differ in how these project attributes are determined. 
Specifically, the contracting-cost mediation model presumes that project attributes may be 
endogenous to project size, whereas the project-risk moderation model considers them to be 
exogenous. This study therefore identifies the theoretical mechanisms that account for the 
importance of project size to contract choice.  
 
Contract Choice in Software Development Outsourcing 
The economics literature shows that the domain of procurement contracts is dominated by two 
contract types, FP and cost-plus (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001; Laffont & Tirole, 1993; McAfee & 
McMillan, 1986). Research on software development outsourcing similarly distinguishes 
between FP contracts, in which the price for delivery is prespecified, and T&M contracts, in 
which the vendor is reimbursed for its costs plus a predetermined profit (Banerjee & Duflo, 
2000; Gopal et al., 2003; Lichtenstein, 2004; Whang, 1992).  
To make explicit the context and theoretical assumptions, we briefly delineate Holmstrom's 
(1989) influential formulation of a moral hazard problem. The model assumes an uncertain 
venture, commissioned by a risk-neutral client and executed by a risk-averse vendor whose 
actions are not fully observable. The venture yields an uncertain payoff that depends on the 
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vendor's effort. The client designs a contract that the vendor is ready to take. The contract is also 
designed to encourage adequate effort, without overly burdening the vendor with risk. The 
solutions of this model include the two commonplace FP and T&M contracts. Specific to our 
context, an FP contract optimizes the vendor's effort to reduce the development cost because the 
vendor pays cost overruns and keeps cost savings. However, risk sharing is not optimal because 
the risk-averse vendor, rather than the risk-neutral client, accepts the risk of cost overruns. 
Because of this inefficiency, the model shows that an FP contract is likely when uncertainty is 
low. The opposite solution of a T&M contract is optimal for risk sharing, but it does not induce 
optimal effort. The risk-averse vendor has no incentive to exert effort to reduce costs because all 
its costs are paid by the client. This type of contract is likely when uncertainty is high. 
Based on this formulation, numerous considerations affecting contract choice have been 
studied. A consideration relevant to software development is its multidimensional nature. For 
example, an FP contract may induce the vendor to decrease quality, which is less measureable, in 
order to reduce costs (Dey et al., 2010). This risk drives the client to accept a T&M contract 
when uncertainty is high. Uncertainty about ex post adaptations is also particularly relevant to 
software development. The client may accept the lower incentive to reduce costs associated with 
a T&M contract in exchange for a lower risk of costly renegotiation and adaptation, in particular 
when ex post adaptations are more probable (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). 
Studies on software development outsourcing frequently draw their predictive power from 
the identification of project attributes that explain why firms prefer one contract type over the 
other. For example, Gopal et al. (2003) found that certain attributes, such as uncertainty as to 
requirements, project size, and number of prior projects, are associated with higher probabilities 
of either FP or T&M contracts. Other researchers have made similar observations about different 
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attributes, such as business familiarity (Gefen et al., 2008) and project duration (Dey et al., 
2010). 
Table 1 presents a summary of the literature on software development outsourcing that 
looks at contract choice. The table does not take account of more general studies on IT 
transactions that analyze contracts for services that include, but are not limited to, software 
development (e.g., Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). Table 1 demonstrates 
that project size (reflected in such attributes as effort, team size, function points, price, and 
duration) is included as an exogenous variable in studies that examine contract choice. The table 
further shows that research has investigated the extent to which contract choice is associated with 
various attributes, including those that are project-related (e.g., quality requirements, 
specification uncertainty, and project detail) and vendor-related (e.g., vendor size, location, and 
capabilities, previous experience with the vendor). Finally, the table demonstrates the importance 
of contract choice and its linkages with system quality and vendor profitability.   
 
Theoretical Analysis 
We begin our theoretical analysis by briefly summarizing the finding that contract choice is  
determined by project size (Gopal et al., 2003). We then develop two models that offer 
integrative explanations for the relationship between project size and contract choice. These 
models are summarized in Table 2.  
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Table 1. Contract Choice in Software Development Outsourcing Studies 
Study 
No. of 
projects 
Contract 
choice 
 
Variables Key findings 
Banerjee and Duflo 
(2000) 
230 FP-58% 
T&M-15% 
Mixed-27% 
Project size (man-months), vendor and client size, experience, and 
location, familiarity with area and platform, project estimate and 
actual cost, attribution of cost overruns  
Low-reputation firms are more likely to get FP contracts 
Gopal et al. (2003); 
Gopal and 
Sivaramakrishnan 
(2008) 
93 FP-59% 
T&M-41% 
Project size (person days), project duration, team size, project profit, 
client size, experience, and reputation, previous projects and 
expectation for future business, specification uncertainty, level of 
competition, project importance, employee turnover 
 
 
T&M contracts have higher requirement uncertainty, 
higher risk in recruiting and retaining personnel, larger 
project size, and higher profitability; 
Vendors prefer FP contracts for larger and longer 
projects; T&M contracts are more profitable when 
employee attrition risk is high 
Lichtenstein (2004) 17 FP-100% Contract price, project duration, number of milestones, specification 
detail, project uncertainty and specificity 
Use of FP contracts alone is inefficient, particularly 
because major maintenance work is executed as T&M 
Ethiraj et al. (2005) 138 FP-61% 
T&M-39% 
Project size (function points), effort (person months), duration, team 
size, project contribution (profit), effort overrun, schedule slippage, 
number of in-process defects   
Higher profits in T&M contracts 
Gefen et al. (2008) 270 FP-67% 
T&M-21% 
Mixed-12% 
Contract price, project duration, vendor size and location, software 
complexity, contract detail (number of pages, external 
documentation), previous contracts with the vendor 
Familiar vendors are more likely to get T&M contracts, 
thus mitigating the client risk of these relatively open 
contracts 
Dey et al. (2010) 15 FP-40% 
T&M-27% 
Mixed-7% 
Other-26% 
Contract duration, quality requirements, client project knowledge, 
outcome measurability 
In addition to FP and T&M contracts, two types of 
complex pricing mechanisms have been identified in 
actual agreements: performance-based and profit-sharing 
contracts 
Tiwana (2010) 120 FP-74% 
T&M-26% 
Project scope (size, complexity, person-months), duration, prior 
client-vendor relationship, client knowledge, vendor size, 
experience, and location, platform and industry indications, vendor 
system development capabilities, outcome, behavior, and clan 
controls 
Informal clan control substitutes outcome control, but 
complements behavior control; contract type has no 
influence on these effects 
Ramachandran and 
Gopal (2010) 
85 FP-61% 
T&M-39% 
Effort (person days), duration, team size, financial risk, requirement 
instability, technological complexity, inadequacy of trained 
personnel, previous projects completed for the client, subjective 
performance 
Managers' subjective judgment of project cost and 
duration performance is biased by their risk anticipation; 
contract type moderates this effect 
Gopal and Koka 
(2010, 2012) 
(subsets of a single 
dataset) 
105 FP-~60% 
T&M-~40% 
Effort (person days), duration, team size, requirement and 
technology uncertainty, client experience, availability of trained 
personnel and related asset specificity, previous projects completed 
for the client, quality, profit 
Differences between FP and T&M contracts: system 
quality is higher in FP contracts, vendor profitability is 
related to quality only in FP contracts, flexibility in 
project management increases vendor profitability in FP 
contracts and system quality in T&M contracts 
"Mixed" contracts include both FP and T&M components. 
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Table 2. Summary of the Two Models of Contract Choice 
 Contracting-Cost Mediation Model Project-Risk Moderation Model 
Literature Transaction cost economics Organization theory, information systems 
Theoretical perspective Contracting efficiency (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993) Contingency approach applied to software project risk 
management (Barki et al., 2001) 
Objective in deciding on contract 
type 
Use a contract that balances the costs of drafting detailed 
contracts with the benefits of reducing vendor opportunism 
Use a contract that reflects the risk management attributes of 
formal planning or user participation 
Nature of project attributes 
(project detail, vendor 
familiarity) decisions 
Project detail is endogenous – decisions are made to 
maximize the efficiency of contracting  
Project detail and vendor familiarity are exogenous – 
decisions are derived from the overall risk management 
approach to the project 
Implications of project detail Higher project detail increases contracting costs  Higher project detail reflects formal planning as the risk 
management approach 
Implications of vendor familiarity Higher vendor familiarity reduces the likelihood of vendor 
opportunism 
Higher vendor familiarity reflects user participation as the 
risk management approach 
Relation between project size and 
project detail 
Larger projects are less detailed per unit of size Stronger positive effect of project size on the likelihood of 
T&M contracts under conditions of low project detail 
Relation between project size and 
vendor familiarity 
 Stronger positive effect of project size on the likelihood of 
T&M contracts under conditions of high vendor familiarity 
Results Project detail fully mediates the effect of price on contract 
choice, which is also affected by vendor familiarity  
The effect of price on the likelihood of T&M contracts 
decreases as project detail increases 
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Project Size and Contract Choice 
The size of the project is a key decision when planning the development of new software systems 
(Boehm, 1981). Project size is commonly reflected in two different project attributes, cost and 
schedule (Boehm, 1981; Sommerville, 2000). Given the intangible nature of software, the major 
part of the cost in software projects is allocated to manpower effort, measured usually in man-
months (Sommerville, 2000). In the context of contracting, effort is reflected in the price of the 
project, defined as the estimated monetary value of the project at the time the contract is signed. 
The pricing of custom software differs from that of packaged software (Ethiraj et al., 2004). In 
the case of packaged software, costs are not a significant driver of price, because of the zero 
marginal cost of mass producing packaged software (Shapiro & Varian, 1999). Conversely, in 
the case of custom software, the costs of each project need to be covered by the price paid by a 
single client, and thus resource costs are a significant determinant of prices (Ethiraj et al., 2004). 
In the literature on procurement contracts, project size is typically expressed by contract price 
and not by manpower effort (Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). However, price reflects manpower effort 
– either literally in T&M contracts or as vendor estimates of effort, which constitute the basis for 
pricing FP projects (Roditti, 1998).   
In the context of contracting, the schedule (development cycle time) is reflected in the 
duration of the project, defined as the estimated length of time for the completion of the project 
and delivery of the system that has been commissioned (Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). It should be 
noted in the context of new system development that project duration is not related to relational 
duration and contract extendibility (Susarla et al., 2010). While project duration pertains to the 
delivery of the developed system, other contractual aspects may be related to relational 
contracting (Joskow, 1987) and to the timeframe for future similar projects (Susarla et al., 2010). 
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Project size has been found to be associated with contract choice. Gopal et al. (2003), 
through the analysis of data collected on 93 offshore projects from a leading Indian software 
vendor, showed that larger projects were associated with a higher probability of T&M contracts. 
Taking the vendor's perspective, the assumption underlying their analysis was that a risk-averse 
vendor would prefer a T&M contract, all else being equal, in contrast to the preference of a risk-
averse client for an FP contract. This assumption led to the hypothesis that the preference for a 
T&M contract would increase with task uncertainty because the risk-averse vendor would seek 
more protection from risk ex post.  
While Gopal et al. (2003) suggested that task uncertainty was responsible for the 
association between larger projects and T&M contracts, their empirical analysis showed that this 
association was statistically significant even when requirements uncertainty was controlled for. 
Software engineering therefore remained the primary conceptual foundation of this association, 
based on the premise that cost and schedule are more difficult to estimate ex ante in larger 
projects. As the probability and magnitude of estimation errors increase, T&M contracts become 
more efficient than FP contracts because of their ability to facilitate ex post adaptation (Bajari & 
Tadelis, 2001). 
 
Contracting-Cost Mediation Model 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is the theory most frequently invoked to explain why 
organizations decide to outsource (Dibbern et al., 2004). TCE reasons that more complete 
contracts mitigate ex post opportunism, but at the cost of additional ex ante contracting cost 
(Bajari & Tadelis, 2001; Corts & Singh, 2004; Williamson, 1985). Crocker and Reynolds (1993) 
apply this reasoning to develop the contracting efficiency approach. They argue that were 
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contracting costless, it would be possible to write ex ante sufficiently complete contracts to 
circumscribe all ex post vendor opportunism. However, the costs of identifying contingencies, 
devising responses, and reaching agreements are considerable. The parties therefore balance the 
costs of additional resources expended in ex ante design against the benefits of mitigating ex post 
opportunism. Crocker and Reynolds (1993) argue that the optimal contract "involves a tradeoff 
between these opposing forces, the magnitudes of which may be predicted based on observable 
characteristics of the transactors and of the exchange environment" (p. 126). Based on an 
empirical investigation of U.S. Air Force engine procurement, Crocker and Reynolds (1993) 
show that contract choice is determined by the variables affecting the marginal cost of 
contracting and the expectations of opportunistic vendor behavior. Following this reasoning, we 
identify project detail and vendor familiarity as two key attributes that respectively reflect the 
costs and benefits of contracting, thus determining contract choice. As explained below, project 
detail is related to the marginal cost of ex ante design and vendor familiarity is related to the 
expectations of ex post opportunistic vendor behavior. The latter relation is based on the notion 
that "although a contractor's likelihood of engaging in future opportunistic behavior…cannot be 
observed directly, past experience may serve as a useful guide" (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993, p. 
135). As shown in Table 1, previous studies have found these project- and vendor-related 
attributes to be associated with contract choice.  
Project detail. In the context of software development outsourcing, the level of detail in 
project planning documents reflects the cost of contracting. This level of detail, which we call 
"project detail", is related to both system specification (its functionality and interfaces) and 
project plan (the sequence and schedule of outcomes or deliverables). These two aspects of 
project detail are reflected in what the software industry calls milestones. Sommerville (2000) 
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defines a milestone as an endpoint of a software process activity. He notes, however, that it is not 
necessary for all activities to end at a milestone. If milestones are excessively frequent, the 
project team spends too much time preparing milestones that may not be essential for the 
progress of the project. If milestones are infrequent, progress problems may lie undetected for 
long periods of time. Milestones are often a way to monitor progress against a carefully defined 
specification (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003). They can therefore be regarded as a mechanism 
of control, primarily of outcomes but also of behavior (Eisenhardt, 1985; Kirsch, 1997; Ouchi, 
1979). Milestones, as controls, are generally intended to check the quality of the software 
provided by the vendor and to monitor that the vendor's personnel perform their work (Dibbern 
et al., 2008). The reasoning of Crocker and Reynolds (1993) suggests that high project detail, 
reflected in many milestones, is negatively associated with the probability of T&M contracts. As 
an illustration, consider a project in which the system specification and project plan are defined 
in minute detail through a large number of milestones. In such a project, the vendor can 
accurately estimate its costs and agree on a fixed price, and the client can expect to get the 
minutely-defined system and therefore has no incentive to prefer the more risky T&M contract. 
The same reasoning applies to a project with limited detail and a small number of milestones. In 
such a project, the vendor finds it difficult to estimate its costs and set a fixed price, and the 
client finds it difficult to control the progress of the project and therefore has to be involved in 
project management as is common in T&M contracts (Banerjee & Duflo, 2000). This reasoning 
suggests that the probability of FP contracts increases with the detail of the project plan. 
Hypothesis 1a. Project detail is negatively associated with the likelihood of T&M contracts.  
Vendor familiarity. This attribute represents the extent of previous experience with a 
specific vendor. The contract theory literature views vendor familiarity, or repeated transactions, 
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as a central mechanism to reduce opportunism (Radner, 1985). Consistent with this view, the 
literature on familiarity and trust in inter-firm arrangements shows that vendor familiarity, 
especially when the client can choose among many vendors, is an indicator of past trusting 
behavior (Gulati, 1995). Vendor familiarity is thus a central antecedent of trust, implying that the 
client and vendor can depend on each other to do the right thing and not take undue advantage of 
the situation (Gefen et al., 2008). As a result, T&M contracts are more probable with familiar 
vendors because of the lower likelihood of vendor opportunism. Stated in terms of trust, honesty 
and openness are crucial for ongoing cost accounting and functionality changes, typical of T&M 
contracts, and they evolve gradually between client and vendor (Kern & Willcocks, 2002). 
Vendor familiarity reduces the need to rely on intensive controls and detailed contracts to ensure 
expected outcomes (Kumar et al., 1995). A second aspect of vendor familiarity is the scale 
economies in accounting costs. When a specific vendor is frequently contracted, it is more 
efficient to contract on a T&M basis, because the costs involved in setting up coordination and 
accounting procedures are more easily recovered. Accordingly, the extent of prior interactions 
with a specific vendor has been shown to be positively associated with the probability of T&M 
contracts (Gefen et al., 2008; Gopal et al., 2003).  
Hypothesis 1b. Vendor familiarity is positively associated with the likelihood of T&M contracts. 
While economic theory provides a rationale for the implications of project detail and 
vendor familiarity for contract choice, it does not account for the implications of project size. 
The contracting efficiency approach (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993) does not include project size as 
an explanatory variable. TCE, the theory upon which this approach is founded, does not take 
transaction size into consideration. In a recent comprehensive review of TCE research, that of 
Macher and Richman (2008), scant attention is paid to the attributes of size, volume, duration, 
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and price. We suggest that this gap in the economic literature is the result of a mediated effect of 
project size on contract choice, according to which project size affects other project attributes 
that bear on contract choice. In particular, we hypothesize that project size affects the attribute of 
project detail. 
We expect project size to have a negative effect on project detail. Diseconomies of scale in 
software development result from the increased complexity of larger projects related to the 
interfaces among system components, communication between project personnel, and project 
management activities (Banker & Kemerer, 1989). Diseconomies relevant to ex ante project 
detail are related to both system specification and system design. In particular, the specification 
of larger software projects involves more functionalities and use cases. The interactions among 
functionalities, which are often an important part of the specification, grow exponentially with 
the number of functionalities. Similarly, design documents of larger systems include more 
modules and more interfaces, requiring the consideration of a larger number of interactions. As a 
result, we expect larger projects to be characterized by lower project detail per unit of size.   
Hypothesis 1c. Project size (price and duration) is negatively associated with project detail.  
It should be noted that our mediation model is incomplete in the sense that we found no 
theoretical explanation for an effect of project size on vendor familiarity. However, as both 
project detail and vendor familiarity are hypothesized to influence contract choice, the model is a 
complete reflection of contracting efficiency reasoning (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993).  
In conclusion, we suggest that the economic literature, in particular the contracting 
efficiency approach, can be brought forward to support a model in which contract choice is 
determined by project detail, which mediates the effect of project size, and by vendor familiarity 
(Figure 1). 
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Project-Risk Moderation Model 
Organizational theory offers another explanation of how project size is associated with contract 
choice. In particular, the contingency approach to software project risk management (Barki et al., 
2001) is brought forward in support of a moderation model, in which the relationship between 
project size and contract choice is moderated by the profile of risk management. Organizational 
contingency studies typically explore research models in which the dependent variables are 
aspects of organizational performance (e.g., Delery & Doty, 1996; Govindarajan, 1988; 
Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). Consistent with this approach, Barki et al. (2001) use project 
performance as their dependent variable. The model developed here diverges from this approach 
because it uses contract choice as the dependent variable. Nevertheless, we consider the 
contingency approach to be valuable in understanding how contract choice is affected by the 
interactions between project size and other project attributes. The contingency approach allows 
us to highlight the ability of managers to decide on project detail and vendor familiarity in the 
context of larger projects.   
Contract 
Choice 
Vendor 
Familiarity 
Project 
Attributes 
Price 
Duration 
 
Project 
Size 
Likelihood of 
T&M contracts 
Figure 1. Contracting-Cost Mediation Model (Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c)   
Project 
Detail 
H1a (−) 
H1b (+) 
H1c (−) 
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Contingency theory, one of the most influential theories in the study of organizational 
design and performance, assumes that there is no single best way to organize and that any 
specific way of organizing is not equally effective under all conditions (Galbraith, 1973; 
Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 1985). Central to this theory is the proposition that the structure and 
process of an organization must fit its environment for it to be effective (Drazin & Van de Ven, 
1985). Barki et al. (2001) applied this theory to propose that the performance of a software 
development project is contingent on the fit between the uncertainty and risk involved in the 
project (risk exposure) and the attributes of risk management, which include formal planning, 
internal integration, and user participation. This approach implies that risk management 
attributes should be exogenously determined in light of the level of uncertainty and risk inherent 
in the project to yield superior project performance.  
We apply this approach to describe the relationship between project size and the attributes 
of project detail and vendor familiarity. Barki et al. (2001) note that project size is often 
described using the terms uncertainty and risk, suggesting that larger projects have higher risk 
exposure. Furthermore, project detail and vendor familiarity are attributes of the risk 
management profile. First, project detail, and specifically the intensity of milestones, is 
conceptually close to formal planning, defined as "the reliance on plans, schedules, and budgets 
to ensure the efficient and timely execution of a project" (Barki et al., 2001, p. 44). Second, 
vendor familiarity in outsourced projects provides many of the benefits of user participation in 
in-house projects, the setting on which Barki et al. (2001) focus. Specifically, vendor familiarity 
facilitates mutual interaction, information exchange, and the transfer of knowledge about the 
client's business processes and systems (Gefen et al., 2008). Third, project detail and vendor 
familiarity have been identified in the literature (Table 1) as key project- and vendor-related 
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attributes that influence project risk. This reasoning suggests that project detail and vendor 
familiarity are attributes of the risk management profile and thus they should be decided upon in 
the context of project size. 
Generally, the moderation perspective defines fit as a set of bivariate interactions between 
environmental and structural variables that affect performance (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; 
Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). Our moderation model defines fit as a set of bivariate 
interactions of project size (price and duration) with attributes of the risk management profile 
(project detail and vendor familiarity) that affect contract choice. Specifically, we reason that the 
client may actively act upon the characteristics of the project to moderate the effect of project 
size on the type of contract being used. As noted earlier, while the client prefers FP contracts 
because the risk of cost overruns is borne by the vendor (Gopal et al., 2003), the client also 
wishes to control the risk of low quality (Dey et al., 2010). Project size is negatively associated 
with the probability of FP contracts because larger projects involve more risks of cost escalation 
and low quality. A risk management alternative available to the client is an approach of formal 
planning (Barki et al., 2001). In terms of contracting, formal planning means an increase in 
project detail, namely, a higher intensity of milestones that reflect the project planning agreed 
upon between client and vendor (including delivery milestones to allow the client to test, accept, 
and pay for intermediate project outcomes). The higher project detail increases the probability of 
FP contracts because the client has better control over the risk of low quality and, consequently, 
cost considerations become more salient. Therefore, high project detail weakens the association 
between larger projects and the use of T&M contracts. 
Hypothesis 2a. Project detail reduces the positive association between project size (price and 
duration) and the likelihood of T&M contracts. 
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Another risk management alternative available to the client is an approach of user 
participation, which refers to all activities that increase communication and information 
exchange with users (Barki et al., 2001). In the context of contracting, user participation is more 
feasible (less costly) with vendors that are more familiar with the client's IT architecture, 
business processes, and personnel (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993; Gefen et al., 2008). In contrast 
to project detail, which addresses the risk of low quality ex ante, vendor familiarity address the 
risk of low quality ex post, through continuous user feedback on system functionality and 
subsequent adaptation. This risk management approach, however, is effective only if the type of 
contract used accommodates ex post adaptation, namely, a T&M contract. Consistent with Barki 
et al.'s (2001) conceptualization of fit, high vendor familiarity strengthens the association 
between larger projects and the use of T&M contracts because of the complementarity between 
the risk exposure of large projects and the risk management approach of user participation 
through vendor familiarity. 
Hypothesis 2b. Vendor familiarity increases the positive association between project size (price 
and duration) and the likelihood of T&M contracts. 
In conclusion, contingency theory and its application to software project risk management 
are brought forward in support of a model in which contract choice is determined by the 
interaction of project size with project detail and vendor familiarity (Figure 2).   
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Research Method 
We tested the hypotheses stated above with one of the largest contract portfolios of software 
development outsourcing projects reported to date in the literature. The research setting is the 
highly competitive financial services industry, which is the largest user of IT in the industrial 
sector (Zhu et al., 2004) and which tends to have the highest IT investment risk (Dewan et al., 
2007). The contract portfolio that we analyzed includes 237 contracts for software development 
performed between January 2000 and April 2003 for a leading European bank. The bank, which 
is among the largest in the world, provides retail and commercial banking, wealth management, 
and investment banking in dozens of countries and has tens of thousands of employees. The 
bank's IT department employs about 3,000 permanent employees and 2,000 contractors. The 
bank's systems are either developed in-house, by internal staff complemented by external 
consultants and programmers, or they are developed through outsourced projects. The bank 
contracts out software development through about 100 local and international vendors, and its 
methods of managing outsourced projects are typical of other large institutions.  
Price 
Duration 
 
Project 
Size 
 
Vendor 
Familiarity 
Project 
Attributes 
Project 
Detail 
H2a   (−) H2b   (+) 
Contract 
Choice 
Likelihood of 
T&M contracts 
Figure 2. Project-Risk Moderation Model (Hypotheses 2a and 2b)  
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Our study continues the recent trend toward the analysis of contractual provisions in actual 
outsourcing contracts (e.g., Argyres et al., 2007; Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009). Consistent with 
previous research, the unit of analysis in this study is a contract. Data were collected from the 
bank's contract repository (an archive of the actual contracts). Each record in the repository 
represented a single contract and included the contract number, start and end dates, contract 
price, vendor name, and an electronic scan of the contract. The distinction between FP and T&M 
contracts was explicitly stated in the contracts. Among the 237 contracts in our dataset, there 
were 180 FP contracts and 57 T&M contracts. 
Project size attributes were evaluated as follows. Price was defined as the total price of the 
contract in U.S. dollars. The price of each contract was copied as explicitly stated in the contract. 
This value represented the binding price for FP contracts or the estimated price for T&M 
contracts. The contracts included no information about the extent of manpower effort, but only 
information about its price. Duration was defined as the number of days between the contract's 
start date and its expected completion date, as recorded in the contract repository. This value 
represented the duration of the project as contracted between the bank and the vendor. 
Project detail was operationally defined as the intensity of milestones specified in the 
contract, and it was calculated as the sum of payment, delivery, and project milestones, divided 
(normalized) by the contract price in thousands of dollars. Payment milestones were taken as 
those milestones at which a portion of the price was due. Delivery milestones were taken as 
delivery dates at which a work package had to be delivered to the client without a payment. 
Project milestones were neither payment nor delivery milestones; rather, they represented 
defined end-points in the progress of the project (e.g., compulsory meetings, client sign-off of 
specification documents, or the end of internal testing). 
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Vendor familiarity was operationally defined as the ex ante accumulated experience with 
the specific vendor, and it was calculated as the accumulated price of previous contracts signed 
with the same vendor after January 2000 and up to the specific contract. This operationalization 
of vendor familiarity was based on the reasoning presented by Gefen et al. (2008), consistent 
with research that examined previous client-vendor experience (Gopal & Koka, 2010, 2012; 
Tiwana, 2010).  
All the measures described above were objective and involved no subjective judgment. 
Descriptive statistics for these measures are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Attribute Description Unit Minimum Maximum Mean Std. dev. 
Price Total price of the contract $K 2.083 2,791.667 272.332 407.032 
Duration Duration of the project Days 3 880 184.058 143.294 
Project 
detail 
Intensity of milestones 
specified in the contract 
Milestones 
per $K 
0 2.280 0.105 0.224 
Vendor 
familiarity 
Ex ante accumulated 
experience with the 
specific vendor 
$K 0 21,037.460 4,192.848 5,799.975 
 
 
Data Analysis 
A common approach in previous studies has been to use the log of variables that measure 
monetary value because of their skewed distribution (e.g., Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009; Ethiraj et 
al., 2005). We therefore used the log of price and vendor familiarity in testing the hypotheses. 
Another common approach in using regression analysis to test for moderation is to center the 
continuous variables with respect to their means (Aiken & West, 1991; Espinosa et al., 2007; 
Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). This approach addresses problems of multicollinearity that may arise 
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from estimating regression models that include both main and interaction effects of the same 
continuous variables. This approach also produces more interpretable results because the 
coefficient of a variable represents its effect when the moderating variable is at its mean, and the 
coefficient of the interaction term represents how this effect changes as the moderating variable 
departs from the mean. We consequently mean-centered all four attributes of price, duration, 
project detail, and vendor familiarity. This approach had no influence on the results for the 
contracting-cost mediation model other than producing different intercept values, which 
represented the values of the dependent variable when the variables included in the regression 
analyses were at their respective means. The resulting correlation matrix for the examined 
attributes is presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
Attribute Price (log) Duration Project detail 
Vendor 
familiarity (log) 
Price (log) 1    
Duration 0.496*** 1   
Project detail -0.530*** -0.176** 1  
Vendor 
familiarity (log) 
0.307*** 0.119 -0.271*** 1 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; two-tailed p values are reported. 
 
We started the analysis by establishing the association between project size and contract 
choice in the current dataset. Because contract choice was a binary variable (FP = 0, T&M = 1), 
we used logistic regression to estimate the effects of the project size attributes of price and 
duration on contract choice. The results of this logistic regression analysis, presented in Table 5, 
show that price alone had a significant positive effect on contract choice (higher price was 
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associated with a higher likelihood of T&M contracts), while the effect of duration on contract 
choice was not statistically significant. 
 
Table 5. Results of Logistic Regression Testing the Effect of Price and Duration on 
Contract Choice 
Attribute Coefficient Std. err. Wald p-value 
Intercept -1.282 0.174 54.517 0.000 
Price (log) 0.914 0.343 7.081 0.008 
Duration 0.001 0.001 0.578 0.447 
χ2(2) = 14.737, p<0.001 
Log likelihood = -113.208 
Pseudo R
2
 (Nagelkerke) = 0.097 
Contract choice: FP = 0, T&M = 1 
 
 
Testing the Contracting-Cost Mediation Model 
Our approach to testing the contracting-cost mediation model was first to test whether 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c were supported and then to test whether the effect of project size 
(price and duration) on contract choice was fully mediated by project detail. Hypotheses 1a and 
1b were tested by regressing contract choice on project detail and vendor familiarity. The results 
of this logistic regression analysis, presented in Table 6, showed that the likelihood of T&M 
contracts was negatively affected by project detail and positively affected by vendor familiarity, 
providing support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b.  
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Table 6. Results of Logistic Regression Testing Hypotheses 1a and 1b  
(Effect of Project Detail and Vendor Familiarity on Contract Choice) 
Attribute Coefficient Std. err. Wald p-value 
Intercept -2.074 0.417 24.732 0.000 
Project detail -12.252 4.804 6.504 0.011 
Vendor familiarity (log) 0.870 0.287 9.214 0.002 
χ2(2) = 29.745, p<0.001 
Log likelihood = -84.902 
Pseudo R
2
 (Nagelkerke) = 0.226 
Contract choice: FP = 0, T&M = 1 
 
Hypothesis 1c was tested by regressing project detail on price and duration. Given that 
project detail was measured on a ratio scale, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis 
was performed to estimate the effects of price and duration on project detail. The results of this 
regression analysis, presented in Table 7, showed that price negatively affected project detail, 
while duration had no significant effect on project detail. Therefore, Hypothesis 1c was 
supported for price, but not for duration.  
 
Table 7. Results of OLS Regression Testing Hypothesis 1c  
(Effect of Price and Duration on Project Detail) 
Attribute Coefficient Std. err. 
Standardized 
coefficient p-value 
Intercept -0.004 0.013 --- 0.749 
Price (log) -0.193 0.023 -0.558 0.000 
Duration 0.157×10
-3
 0.104×10
-3
 0.101 0.133 
F = 39.518, p<0.001 
R
2
 = 0.266 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.259 
 
Next, we tested whether project detail fully mediated the effect of project size on contract 
choice. The classic procedure for testing mediation was outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986). 
This procedure was designed to assess the relationships among three variables – independent 
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variable, mediating variable, and outcome variable – to determine the extent to which the effect 
of the independent variable on the outcome variable is mediated by the mediating variable. The 
procedure is based on the estimation of three regression equations (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The 
first equation regresses the outcome variable on the independent variable, establishing the 
existence of a "total effect" that may be mediated. The second equation regresses the mediating 
variable on the independent variable. The third equation regresses the outcome variable on both 
the mediating variable and the independent variable. The following conditions must hold to 
establish mediation: the independent variable must affect the outcome variable in the first 
equation; the independent variable must affect the mediating variable in the second equation; and 
the mediating variable must affect the outcome variable in the third equation. If these conditions 
all hold in the predicted direction, then the effect of the independent variable on the outcome 
variable must be smaller in the third equation than in the first, thus establishing the existence of 
mediation. Full mediation holds if the independent variable has no effect on the outcome variable 
when the mediating variable is controlled.    
The procedure outlined above was used to test whether the effect of project size 
(independent variable) on contract choice (outcome variable) was fully mediated by project 
detail (mediating variable). The first step involved regressing contract choice on price and 
duration. The results of this logistic regression analysis were already presented in Table 5 and 
showed that price had a significant total effect on contract choice. The second step involved 
regressing project detail on price and duration. The results of this OLS regression analysis were 
already presented in Table 7 and showed that price significantly affected project detail. The third 
and final step involved regressing contract choice on all four attributes – project detail, vendor 
familiarity, price, and duration. Vendor familiarity was included in this analysis to control for its 
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effect on contract choice and to allow for the estimation of the complete contracting-cost 
mediation model. The results of the logistic regression analysis, presented in Table 8, showed 
that the effects of project detail and vendor familiarity on contract choice were consistent with 
those presented in Table 6. However, when project detail and vendor familiarity were controlled, 
price and duration had no direct effect on contract choice.  
 
Table 8. Results of Logistic Regression Testing the Effect of  
All Four Attributes on Contract Choice 
Attribute Coefficient Std. err. Wald p-value 
Intercept -1.957 0.415 22.251 0.000 
Project detail -10.000 4.887 4.187 0.041 
Vendor familiarity (log) 0.847 0.297 8.152 0.004 
Price (log) 0.276 0.417 0.438 0.508 
Duration 0.474×10
-3
 1.482×10
-3
 0.102 0.749 
χ2(4) = 27.559, p<0.001 
Log likelihood = -82.933 
Pseudo R
2
 (Nagelkerke) = 0.217 
Contract choice: FP = 0, T&M = 1 
 
Overall, application of the procedure of Baron and Kenny (1986) for testing mediation 
showed that of the two project size attributes, price alone met the requirements for full 
mediation: price had a significant total effect on contract choice, it had a significant effect on 
project detail, and it had no direct effect on contract choice when project detail was controlled. 
Duration, in contrast, failed to meet the fundamental requirement for a total effect on contract 
choice, and its effect on project detail was nonsignificant.  
 
 
 
 
 28 
Testing the Project-Risk Moderation Model 
Contingency research often uses interaction terms in regression analyses to test for moderation 
(Delery & Doty, 1996; Govindarajan, 1988; Venkatraman, 1989). This approach was employed 
to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b by including all possible two-way interactions of price and duration 
with project detail and vendor familiarity in the logistic regression for contract choice. 
Consequently, contract choice was regressed on the four attributes of project detail, vendor 
familiarity, price, and duration and on the four interactions of the two latter attributes with the 
two former attributes. The results of this logistic regression analysis, presented in Table 9, 
showed that in addition to the negative effect of project detail and the positive effect of vendor 
familiarity (consistent with the results for the contracting-cost mediation model), the interaction 
of price with project detail was also statistically significant, supporting Hypothesis 2a for price.
1
 
As predicted, the coefficient for this interaction was negative, implying that the effect of price on 
the likelihood of T&M contracts decreased as project detail increased. The logistic regression 
analysis showed that the coefficients for the other interactions were not statistically significant, 
providing no support for Hypothesis 2b.
2
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Multiplying the log of price by project detail, calculated as the total number of milestones divided by price (in 
thousands of dollars), may raise concerns about having different representations of price in both the numerator and 
denominator of this interaction term. These concerns were addressed by repeating the same logistic regression 
analysis, but with the mean-centered total number of milestones (not normalized by price) replacing project detail. 
This change had little impact on the results – the number of milestones had a negative effect (B = -0.189, p<0.001), 
vendor familiarity had a positive effect (B = 1.367, p<0.001), and the interaction of price with the number of 
milestones had a negative effect (B = -0.300, p<0.01), while the remaining coefficients were not statistically 
significant.  
2
 Our findings for the project-risk moderation model were confirmed by employing an alternative approach in which 
the interaction terms for project detail (H2a) and those for vendor familiarity (H2b) were separately entered into the 
regression equation with the four attributes. The results of these two different logistic regression analyses were 
entirely consistent with our original findings.  
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Table 9. Results of Logistic Regression Testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b (Effect of Interactions of 
Price and Duration with Project Detail and Vendor Familiarity on Contract Choice) 
Attribute Coefficient Std. err. Wald p-value 
Intercept -2.489 0.571 19.020 0.000 
Project detail -16.548 6.706 6.088 0.014 
Vendor familiarity (log) 0.923 0.308 9.010 0.003 
Price (log) -0.638 0.572 1.245 0.264 
Duration 0.002 0.004 0.370 0.543 
Price (log) × project detail  -10.851 4.671 5.397 0.020 
Price (log) ×  
vendor familiarity (log) 
0.225 0.458 0.243 0.622 
Duration × project detail 0.036 0.044 0.654 0.419 
Duration ×  
vendor familiarity (log) 
0.001 0.003 0.313 0.576 
χ2(8) = 32.344, p<0.001 
Log likelihood = -80.540 
Pseudo R
2
 (Nagelkerke) = 0.252 
Contract choice: FP = 0, T&M = 1 
 
In testing for moderation, Carte and Russell (2003) argued that ΔR2 should be used instead 
of the interaction coefficient as an index of moderator effect size. We applied this approach to 
logistic regression by using Δχ2 to estimate the moderator effect size. Using hierarchical logistic 
regression, the interaction of price with project detail was entered into the regression equation 
after the four attributes of project detail, vendor familiarity, price, and duration had been entered. 
The results showed that the Wald value for the negative coefficient of the interaction term was 
significant at the 0.05 level (Wald = 4.564, p = 0.033) and the Δχ2 between the two equations 
(with and without the interaction term) was significant at the 0.1 level (Δχ2(1) = 2.945, p = 0.086).   
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Discussion 
In this study, we sought to uncover the mechanisms that explain the overall effect of project size 
on contract choice. As a baseline, we validated the existing evidence of a higher likelihood of 
T&M contracts for larger software projects (Gopal et al., 2003) for our dataset. The results 
confirmed this relationship when project size was represented by price but not when it was 
represented by duration. Possibly, duration by itself was not strongly linked to manpower effort, 
perhaps because of considerable variability in the size of the development team or the efficiency 
of utilizing the duration of the project.   
On the basis of a brief review of several economic and organizational theories, we 
identified two explanations that incorporate additional attributes, both project-related (project 
detail) and vendor-related (vendor familiarity). The contracting-cost mediation model, 
theoretically anchored in the contracting efficiency approach (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993), 
proposed that contract choice was determined by project detail, which mediated the effect of 
project size, and by vendor familiarity. The project-risk moderation model, theoretically 
anchored in the contingency approach to software project risk management (Barki et al., 2001), 
proposed that the effect of project size on contract choice was moderated by project detail and 
vendor familiarity. The results confirmed the mediated effect for price and the moderated effect 
for the interaction of price with project detail. 
The two models complement one another in some aspects and substitute one another in 
other aspects. The models are founded on the notion that project size is a crucial consideration in 
deciding on contract type, but different explanations are offered for the importance of project 
size, associating larger projects with higher estimation errors (the baseline reasoning), higher 
contracting cost of project detail, and higher project risk exposure. Furthermore, the models 
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assign different roles to project detail and vendor familiarity in the context of project size. These 
project attributes are unobserved in the baseline reasoning, partially determined by (endogenous 
to) project size in the contracting-cost mediation model, and interact with (exogenous to) project 
size in the project-risk moderation model.  
Importantly, the two models differ in the objective of decisions about project detail and 
vendor familiarity. The contracting-cost mediation model assumes that these decisions are driven 
by the motivation of managers to maximize the efficiency of contracting per se, resulting in 
project detail and vendor familiarity being adjusted to balance the costs and benefits of 
contracting for larger projects. The project-risk moderation model assumes that project detail and 
vendor familiarity decisions are driven by the motivation of managers to maximize the likelihood 
of project success, resulting in decisions on the risk management profile that provides the best fit 
to the risk exposure characterizing larger projects.  
This difference in objectives is helpful in interpreting the conceptual models and empirical 
results. The baseline reasoning assumes that the objective of managers is to reduce the negative 
effect of cost estimation errors, which increase with project size. In larger projects, the vendor is 
thus unwilling to contract on an FP basis. The client is similarly unwilling to accept the risk of 
lower quality if cost overruns materialize in an FP contract. Both client and vendor are therefore 
more likely to agree on a T&M contract for larger projects. No additional variables are included 
in the baseline reasoning to allow a more elaborate interpretation. The results confirm this 
reasoning for pricier projects, but not for longer ones. The contracting-cost mediation model 
adds complexity to this reasoning by adding project attributes that reflect contracting costs 
(project detail) and contracting benefits (vendor familiarity). Larger projects are associated with 
more risk and thus with less detail per unit of size, making it more efficient to use T&M 
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contracts for larger projects. The results show that the use of T&M contracts for pricier projects 
is explained by the associations of these projects with lower project detail. Finally, the project-
risk moderation model adds interaction terms among the attributes to draw an elaborate picture 
of the relation between project size and contract choice. Although contracting efficiency 
considerations favor lower detail for larger projects (contracting-cost mediation model), 
managers can react to larger projects by increasing formal planning or user participation. These 
reactions are represented by the interactions of project size with project detail (for formal 
planning) and with vendor familiarity (for user participation). The interaction of larger projects 
with higher detail should increase the use of FP contracts, whereas the interaction of larger 
projects with more familiar vendors should increase the use of T&M contracts. The results show 
that indeed managers at our research site decided to increase project detail for some pricier 
projects and to contract them out on an FP basis.  
 
Implications and Limitations 
Our findings have important practical implications. The findings for the project-risk moderation 
model describe an interaction of project size, proxied by price, with project detail in choosing 
between FP and T&M contracts. This interaction confirms that managers can increase the detail 
of project planning to make FP contracts a more viable option for large projects. Among the 237 
contracts in the portfolio analyzed in this study, 30 contracts were relatively large in size (their 
price was higher than the mean plus one standard deviation). One of these contracts, for instance, 
was for the enhancement of an existing system, and thus project detail could be relatively high 
(the cost of increasing project detail was relatively low). This allowed the bank to use an FP 
contract for this project. Using the baseline reasoning alone could lead managers to unnecessarily 
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choose the more risky T&M contract given the large size of the project. In terms of the project-
risk moderation model, managers at the bank concurrently considered project size and risk 
management practices to reduce the risk involved in this project and ultimately achieve higher 
quality at lower cost.  
The contracting-cost mediation model should assist managers to carefully consider the 
reasons for contract choice. Attributes like the cost of project planning detail and the benefit of 
vendor familiarity are conceptually subtle, difficult to understand, and often difficult to measure 
and agree upon. In contrast, project size attributes, such as price and duration, are easily 
observed. Managers thus frequently base their contract choices solely on project size attributes 
(Lichtenstein, 2004). The reasoning and findings of our contracting-cost mediation model 
suggest that managers should pay more attention to project detail and vendor familiarity in 
making contract choices. In particular, managers should understand that moving away from the 
prescriptions of the contracting-cost mediation model implies that they make compromises in 
terms of contracting efficiency, possibly incurring higher costs and lower benefits, to implement 
the risk management approach they consider as most likely to lead to the successful completion 
of the project. 
More generally, this paper shows that the notion of choosing T&M contracts for large 
projects is a valid first approximation. However, this approximation should be refined to include 
the consideration and manipulation of additional project attributes. Projects that can be defined in 
minute detail without significant cost provide an option to use FP contracts and reduce the 
client's risk. Likewise, using the approximation for small projects is incorrect when project 
planning is extremely costly, because an FP contract may fail to define and provide the right 
functionality.  
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This study has a number of limitations. The first limitation lies in the reliance on a single 
client organization. Consequently, the analysis emphasizes client incentives and preferences, 
while paying less attention to the incentives and preferences of vendors. Furthermore, the large 
size and long experience of this specific client are likely to influence its contracting practices. 
Although learning from such a client is laudable, our empirical results should be generalized to 
other organizations with caution. The second limitation of our empirical findings is related to the 
gap between the technical measures typical of research on software development and the 
economic measures typical of research on procurement contracting. Specifically, we could not 
use manpower effort to measure project size, and instead had to use price and duration. Price is a 
valid proxy for effort because FP pricing is based on the estimated effort and T&M pricing is by 
definition based on the actual effort. Furthermore, the particular context, in which all projects are 
performed either by local vendors or by large European or North-American vendors, ensures that 
labor costs are quite uniform. The third limitation of this study is the reliance on the contracts 
themselves to measure project size, project detail, and vendor familiarity. While these measures 
are part of binding legal documents and thus objective and not subject to bias, our analysis is 
limited by the fact that non-contractual project information was not available to us.  
Two additional limitations are associated with the unavailability of non-contractual data. 
First, the models developed and tested in this study could not be extended to include additional 
project attributes that have been shown to influence contract choice in previous research. Gopal 
et al. (2003) provide a broad coverage of such potential antecedents of contract choice as the 
perceptions of project importance, client and vendor reputation, and their bargaining power. In 
this sense, our analysis is reductionist in nature and focuses on the primary project attributes that 
emerged from our review of the relevant economic and organizational literature. Second, the 
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models do not address aspects of organizational or project performance and therefore they are 
not fully consistent with organizational contingency research or with Barki et al. (2001). The 
above notwithstanding, the unique objective data available to us allowed the empirical 
investigation of ex ante contract choice considerations in a manner that is not biased by ex post 
perceptions.  
 
Conclusion 
Motivated by the recent interest in contract choice in software development outsourcing, this 
study revisits the theoretical foundations of this phenomenon and uncovers additional 
mechanisms of mediation and moderation in the relationship between project size and contract 
choice. Whereas previous research has shown that contract choice is contingent on project size, 
this study contributes to the literature by identifying additional theoretical mechanisms 
underlying these contingencies. These theoretical mechanisms highlight the multiple levels at 
which managers consider the consequences of project size on contract choice. These levels 
include technical aspects of software development cost estimation, economic aspects of 
contracting between client and vendor, and the technical, economic, and organizational aspects 
of project risk management. In so doing, this study provides a multi-layered theoretical 
foundation for why project size matters for contract choice. Future research should follow the 
path outlined in this study to develop richer theoretical models for the relationships between 
project attributes and contract choice. Such models have the potential to significantly advance 
our understanding of the effectiveness of software development outsourcing.   
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